On the one hand, theoretically, if all the cards were played just right, the ANV could have been destroyed.
"Destroyed" would have been extremely difficult. Cut 'em up some more
I can appreciate Meade's doing what he could -- I don't think Grant could have done more. Very few successful pursuits were accomplished after a victory. At least part of the reason is supply: you can't send a division off in pursuit of a fleeing enemy without wagons. And where are those? Somewhere back there. Tangled. Some empty, some full, some lost.
But I can understand Lincoln's frustration, as well. Here was the primary military strength of the Confederacy -- bloodied, tired, beaten, and north of a flooded river. It crossed my mind that fresh troops from the Washington defences could have be sped west on the B&O. There were few points on that retreat where a force large enough to challenge Lee could be concentrated. But how? Dunno.
Meade seems to have done all he could have: send the cavalry.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
I originally voted here that I thought Meade was too lax in his pursuit of Lee, however, after further reading in the book "Retreat from Gettysburg", I have revised my opinion. Having just begun reading of the immediate aftermath of the battle and the condition of both armies, it's becoming clear that Meades army was not in prime condition to launch an effective pursuit of the ANV...in fact it was far from it. Not going into any detail on this thread, but will be posting more info on the thread "Retreat from Gettysburg", should anyone be interested. Thanks.
Terry
__________________ "In this great struggle, this form of Government and every form of human right is endangered if our enemies succeed. There is more involved in this contest than is realized by every one." Abraham Lincoln - August 18, 1864 Speech to the 164th Ohio Regiment
Good point. Add into the mix the fact that Meade had held his job for about a week, fought a 3 day battle on ground that was unfamiliar and sustained massive casualties in both enlisted men and officers.
I have always felt that the Meade should have chased Lee with vigor sentiment was unfair.
Lets not forget that the march frome Virginia to Gettysburg was a very trying march. Than there were 3 days of hard fighting and now your asking the soldiers to go after the Confedrates. On top of all that these soldiers were not in the top physical shape that our soldiers are now.
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Originally Posted by ole
Here was the primary military strength of the Confederacy -- bloodied, tired, beaten, and north of a flooded river.
There is a saying that the most dangerous person in the world is a scared person that is trapped in a corner. I think that if meade had caught up with Lee it does not mean a Union victory.
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It crossed my mind that fresh troops from the Washington defences could have be sped west on the B&O.
I don't know if Lincoln would have been willing to do that. Didn't Lincoln pull the entire I Corps from McClellan during the Peninsula Campaign?
There is a saying that the most dangerous person in the world is a scared person that is trapped in a corner. I think that if meade had caught up with Lee it does not mean a Union victory.
It would certainly have been punishing on Meade had he pursued -- a retreating army leaves a rear guard that can pick and choose where it wants to contest the pursuer's passage. In Lee's case, it would have been a division. The point here is, a pursuit had a chance of at least mauling the retreating force some more, if not destroy that rear guard.
I more or less agree that Meade was unable to mount much more than a harrassing pursuit. I'm mostly interested in the differing opinions of the board.
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I don't know if Lincoln would have been willing to do that. Didn't Lincoln pull the entire I Corps from McClellan during the Peninsula Campaign?
That was then. If it had been considered, and I don't have any reference to suggest that it was, Lincoln might have gone for it, given the prize dangling in front of his nose.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
This book by Kent Masterson Brown is an excellent read on what Lee did on his retreat.
Meade was not greatly prepared for a quick attack. Lee was a very skillful general who set up excellent rear guard to hold up the Union infantry.
Meade did pursue first with cavalry, but cavalry is no great match for attacking infantry.
Brown pointed out that Meade had no idea if Lee would stop in South Mountain and make an interim defense. I think it too much to expect Meade to think Lee would make a direct dash for the Potomac River. Meade did not know the Confederate artillery was virtually out of long range ammunition.
Meade only caught up with his infantry, because Lee couldn't cross the flooding Potomac River. By that time Lee had trenches built and had ferried some ammunition over the Potomac from Winchester.
Retreat from Gettysburg by Brown clearly shows Lee was a master at a fighting retreat, with excellent rear guard action.
I saw a source that mentioned that Meade had no reason to believe that Lee would make a forced march directly from Gettysburg to the Potomac River. Meade, militarily, had to consider that it would not be just rear guard action, but perhaps that Lee would make real defensive stops along the way.
Lee moved his army to the Potomac River, about as fast as it would travel. Lee lost quite a number of soldiers who couldn't keep up with the march, and he virtually guaranteed that he would substantially wreck his horses and mules. Many of the horses had no feed all the way to Virginia. Some would get only hay and one stop for water. Lee's Retreat was not one made to well preserve his artillery horses and the animals pulling the wagons.
If someone had given Meade an intelligence summary that Lee would take flight to Virginia and push his animals hard, someone might question why Lee would help destroy his transportation.
It was folly, but Lee did it. Meade had no way of knowing in the days just after the battle at Gettysburg that Lee was virtually out of long-range artillery ammunition.
But in the end, historians would question Meade, because many could never question Lee and the consequences of his Pennsylvania invasion.
As usual, Whitworth, a thoughtful, telling observation.
Compliments, sir.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
I more or less agree that Meade was unable to mount much more than a harrassing pursuit. I'm mostly interested in the differing opinions of the board.
Meade's opportunity is on July 11th and July 12th, he's there in force and Lee has his back to the river. Opportunity knocks and the Council of War votes against attacking.
On July 13th, Lee essentially gets across the entire Army and on the 14th, the Federal Army realizes they are gone. They don't cross the Potomac until the 17th!
The AoP was Never going to defeat the ANV without fighting.
It is obvious from the historical record and Meade's own words that he had no intention of engaging Lee and the ANV in a battle of any kind, if he could help it.
Laxness was not the problem, Lee escaped becaujse Meade (and his officer corps) wanted him to escape, preferably without fighting.
As far as Meade was concerned, he had accomplished his goals (though not Lincolns or the Nations') when Lee retreated back into Va.
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