How about Patrick Cleburne? He was the only Confederate general who was able to show leadership and put up a good fight at Missionary Ridge, and he saved Bragg's army at Ringold Gap! He was, after all, 'Stonewall of the West'.
While conceding that Cleburne was popular and a very good fighting general, was he not junior in rank? Would there have been problems passing over other, more senior officers in that troubled army?
Unionblue
__________________ "The American people and the Government at Washington may refuse to recognize it for a time but the inexorable logic of events will force it upon them in the end; that the war now being waged in this land is a war for and against slavery." Frederick Douglass
"Loyalty to our ancestors does not include loyalty to their mistakes." George Santayana
Unionblue, You are quite correct, he was under Hardee who was later given that command, but declined to take it permanently. Yes, if there wasn't already enough disharmony amongst those Southern generals, appointing Cleburne would surely have ruffled many feathers.
But the question was 'What would you do?' and if I had the misfortune of being Jefferson Davis at this sorry time, I might have desired to shake things up with a bold step.
After Missionary Ridge, it probably would have made no difference in the long run. I believe that Chattanooga was perhaps the last great turning point of the war - the last point at which the South had the chance to take the initiative. (Imagine the possibilities if Rosecrans'/Thomas' army had been destroyed there ....!) So I might have reached down to someone who had proved to the Confederacy that, as Lincoln said of Grant, "He fights!".
Also I wanted to give bit of a new twist to this thread, which seems to have been floundering a bit.
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Interesting comments on Cleburne. I agree with samgrant that shaking things up at the highest level of the Army of Tennessee might well have been the indicated remedy at this juncture. And General Cleburne in top command would certainly have been a good old shake. But steady and staid President Davis just never seemed to have the stomach for that sort of thing. When did he ever move some deserving commander up the ladder rapidly? I think but once, when so sorely pressed he felt compelled to act, he shook up the Army of Tennessee on the verge of the Battle of Atlanta, removing General Johnston for the equivocal Hood. Obviously he held General Hood in high regard, and had the opportunity to assess him at close range in the Virginia theatre, but Hood did not move up to corps command till Chickamauga. Resoundingly yes, but at the expense of his leg and nearly his life and with a long recuperative time to boot, (or not, in a manner of speaking).
So when Davis finally acts 'outside the box' so to speak, and shakes up the Army of Tennessee, he whiffs. To be sure, he did act when he felt he could no longer afford to hold off, and tapped a man on the scene, a leader who had the pugilistic traits he wanted in the commander of that army. He did get what he asked for; Hood did do that for him. He went right out to smite Sherman's army... and lost Atlanta.
__________________ 'It is the soldier, not the reporter, who has given us freedom of the press. It is the soldier, not the poet, who has given us freedom of speech. It is the soldier, not the campus organizer, who has given us the freedom to demonstrate. It is the soldier, who salutes the flag, who serves beneath the flag, whose coffin is draped by the flag, who allows the protester to burn the flag'
__________________ "The American people and the Government at Washington may refuse to recognize it for a time but the inexorable logic of events will force it upon them in the end; that the war now being waged in this land is a war for and against slavery." Frederick Douglass
"Loyalty to our ancestors does not include loyalty to their mistakes." George Santayana
{ So when Davis finally acts 'outside the box' so to speak, and shakes up the Army of Tennessee, he whiffs. To be sure, he did act when he felt he could no longer afford to hold off, and tapped a man on the scene, a leader who had the pugilistic traits he wanted in the commander of that army-Hood}
{While conceding that Cleburne was popular and a very good fighting general, was he not junior in rank?}
While I do agree that Cleburne was probably a better, and wiser, leader than Hood, and one less prone to 'destroy' his own army to prove a point, or to 'teach' his men a lesson, we need to examine several ideas.
Being a Corps leader didn't prove one could lead an Army, well or otherwise. And I don't think Hood had the personality to be a good Army Commander, but thats My personal opinion.
The issue of Cleburne being junior in rank, even though he was highly thought of by many officers, is interesting. Too many of the officers were too petty to 'allow' a junior from being promoted over themselves, something that makes me think they were more interested in their 'position in life' than they were of finding the Best man for the Job. However, with Cleburne, being a popular personality, many might have done their duty and supported him, something we can surmise but never know for sure.
But, there is something we can be sure of. Davis was too much of a WP man. Being a graduate himself, and having served as Sec. of War, he consided that only a West Pointer could qualify to command an Army. And this mental failing, this unability of looking at the practical results by non-WP officers commanding his Corps, and Divisions prevented him from even considering more than a few for the position. Have to remember, that by this time of the war, he had lost a great many of the officers that filled his 1st qualifier for a high command.
Cleburne vs. Hood. One West Point, one not.
Chuck-just a personal observation.
Good points, Chuck. Southern generals tended to be pretty uppity about rank and standing. Davis's dust up with Joe Johnston and Beauregard about who ranked whom early in the war started the rankle that destroyed the relationships between them. Davis tended to be a by the book guy, and this experience with his generals very early on may have served to hinder what flexibility he may have possessed. He certainly was very slow in moving deserving and proven leaders into important commands. The obvious example is Forrest, another is the extended tenure of Bragg. Now Lincoln was much more agile, not feeling bound by any mores which might hinder his ability to win the war. He plucked lower ranking figures from hither and yon who had proven themselves deserving. It didn't always work out satisfactorily, but it never impaired his ability to act for what he believed was the best.
But if Davis had tapped Cleburne to command, the men of the Army of Tennessee knew his reputation, he fought at thier side, and would gladly have accepted him, as I believe would have the generals. That of course is before 'Let's arm the slaves' proposition, which torpedoed any promotion from Richmond, and may have turned some generals from serving under him, but not all, nor the important ones.
Neil- Thanks. Trust Reggae lyricists to tell us all we need to know.
__________________ 'It is the soldier, not the reporter, who has given us freedom of the press. It is the soldier, not the poet, who has given us freedom of speech. It is the soldier, not the campus organizer, who has given us the freedom to demonstrate. It is the soldier, who salutes the flag, who serves beneath the flag, whose coffin is draped by the flag, who allows the protester to burn the flag'
Remember gentlemen, that there was no e-mail in 1864 and newspaper distribution was a bit tenuous outside the bigger cities. Clebourne's identity would have not been nearly as well known as perhaps it is today. I believe there's some truth in the earlier statement about protection of heirarchy as far as promoting through rank. While Hood may have been challenged by commanding an army, his task became far less complicated thanks to the battle at Franklin.
The Confederate "victory" at Chickamauga was pyrrhic at best. Neither army was in any shape to do much afterwards. Grant came to fix the situation and brought Sherman and Hooker with him. Longstreet went off and uselessly beset Burnside. Thomas' men were itching for a rematch. The Confederate government never seemed to realize the ramifications of the war in Tennessee or the rest of the West for that matter. Attacking the Federal position in Chattanooga would have been suicidal for the weary and decimated Army of Tennessee. Once the Federal army was resupplied it was a foregone conclusion. Give the AOT to a very aggressive commander? See Hood at Franklin
Calicoboy
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My dear mother:- I have come safely through two more terrible engagements with the enemy, that at South Mountain and the great battle of yesterday (Antietam). Our splendid regiment is almost destroyed. We have had nearly 400 men killed and wounded in the battles. Seven of our officers were shot and three killed in yesterday's battle and nearly 150 men killed and wounded. All from less than 300 engaged. The men have stood like iron....Maj. Rufus Dawes, 6th Wisconsin Volunteers