His foe had been the Army of Northern Virginia's commander since the Spring 1862. He quickly established his reputation for being a strategic genius during the Seven Days battles. He and his men racked up victory after victory in the face of an enemy superior in numbers and munitions. He embarrassed Union generals without discrimination -- McClellan, Pope, McClellan again, Burnside, Hooker. General Robert E. Lee, believed by many to be the best commander on either side, once attempted to invade the North in the Fall 1862 but was forced to withdraw after the bloodiest day of the war at Antietam Creek. But he had since mounted stunning and impressive victories at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville in the Winter 1862 and Spring 1863, respectively. The time had again arrived to invade the enemy's homeland.

Lee returned from Richmond to the Army of Northern Virginia in late May 1863 after laying out his invasion plans for Secretary of War James Seddon and President Jefferson Davis. Several elements prompted two separate meetings between the three men. The first was Lee's ideas for a northern invasion. The second was Grant's continued pressing of Vicksburg and what, if anything, Lee could do to alleviate the pressure on General Pemberton in Mississippi. Though Davis himself, upon hearing the precarious position in which Grant had placed Pemberton, thought that elements of Lee's force should be dispatched to Pemberton's aid. However, he would soon acquiesce and endorse Lee's strategy, if for no other reason that to perhaps compel Grant to abandon his Vicksburg assault to help rid Pennsylvania of Lee (Coddington, 1968).

That is, of course, provided Lee would be successful in implementing his strategy. His objectives were formed early in May and remained quite clear in his eyes through his late May meeting with Davis. First, he wanted to eradicate a Federal threat in Virginia. The war in the eastern theater had primarily been fought in Virginia and the carnage had taken its toll on the land. The farmers and townspeople indeed needed the kind of relief an northern invasion would provide. Second, an invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania would re-employ an offensive strategy that Stonewall Jackson had always favored. Included in the objectives of an invasion were the cities of Harrisburg and Philadelphia. In Lee's mind, the capture of one or both of these important Pennsylvanian cities would force Lincoln to finally recognize the legitimacy of the Confederate effort and broach a peace settlement (Hassler, 1970).

Invading the North, Lee surmised, would force Hooker (still in command of Union forces) to pull his troops out and shadow Lee's movements, remaining between Lee and Washington, DC. This would afford Lee the opportunity to fight on ground of his own choosing, positioning himself in such a way as to force Hooker to attack him and, thus, engaging in an offensive-defensive campaign -- that is, taking the offensive while invading enemy territory but taking the defensive in actual battle on that ground (Gallagher, 1992). And on the tenth of June Lee ordered Richard S. Ewell's corps into the Shenandoah Valley, signaling the start of the offensive.

Lee's entire army was on the move, heading north from west of Winchester, Virginia to the Potomac River. General J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry, riding to the east of the army's main body, was serving as a buffer between the two armies and as a scouting unit, reporting enemy movements directly to Lee. Unfortunately for Stuart, his love for adventure and fame, not to mention good positioning by Federal cavalry, brought him into a somewhat embarrassing large-scale engagement at Brandy Station against Alfred Pleasonton's troopers. The Federal cavalry did not wipe out Stuart's force, of course, but they did manage to put a dent in Stuart's ego. As Lee's forces were moving north, Stuart had to rest and refit his men. Once ready, Stuart then began a series of run-around maneuvers in eastern Virginia and Maryland, thus leaving the Federal army between him and Lee. This would cut him off from Lee's main body and would not be reunited with the Confederate force until after the Battle of Gettysburg had begun (Coddington, 1968).

By June 23, advance elements of Lee's force was in Pennsylvania (Ewell's II Corps). General Robert Rodes' division had occupied first Chambersburg, then Carlisle. General Jubal Early's division, moving through Gettysburg on June 24, advanced on and occupied York (Battle of Gettysburg Homepage) . Ewell, eager to take Harrisburg as his prize, prepared for an offensive against the town defended by some 15,000 militiamen and soldiers. Upon hearing of a Federal presence in Maryland that threatened Confederate communication lines, Lee ordered Ewell's corps south toward Cashtown, eight miles west of Gettsyburg (Hassler, 1970). Ewell began his corps movement the next day, as well as Hill's III Corps and Longstreet's I Corps, both coming from the direction of Chambersburg, about 20 miles west of Gettysburg. By June 30, Confederate troops were on the outskirts of Gettysburg.

This expedited concentration of force was prompted by Lee's reports that the Federals were dangerously close, especially considering the spread-out nature of Lee's forces. And it was General Meade, who had taken command on June 28 (just 3 days prior to Gettysburg), who was very much a part of causing problems for Lee. Meade, replacing General Joseph Hooker after an abrupt resignation, didn't have much time to learn the intricacies of high command. The urgency of the situation -- knowing that Lee's army had crossed the Potomac and was invading Pennsylvania -- prompted Meade to act quickly in reorganizing his army and concentrating it in a way as to stay between Lee and Washington.