To the west of town, the Federals were positioning troops to reinforce the already established line south of the Chambersburg Pike as well as extend it to the Mummasburg Road. Thomas Rowley's Third Division of the I Corps, moving in from Emmitsburg, positioned Col. Chapman Biddle's First Brigade of 1,300 men on the left flank of the Union line next to Meredith's Iron Brigade. Col. Roy Stone's 1,300 Buck-tails were positioned to the right of Meredith between McPherson's Woods and the railroad cut in place of Cutler. Cutler was then repositioned to the east on Seminary Ridge north of the Pike.

These Federal troops were positioned to face the renewed Confederate assault that was sure to come from the approaching troops in A.P. Hill's Corps, Heth's division. Heth's First Brigade under Brigadier General James J. Pettigrew, numbering 2,500 strong, and his Second Brigade commanded by Col. John Brockenbrough (a meager 971 troops) were approaching the southern end of the Union line. But near the railroad cut Stone would have to content first with Confederate units approaching from the north.

These men were of General Robert Rodes' strong division of nearly 8,000. The division was emerging from Oak Hill and from the fields to its east. Rodes deployed his brigades in the following order from his left to right: George Doles' 1,300 east of Oak Hill in the fields north of town; A.S. O'Neal's 1,600 on the eastern slope and crest of Oak Hill; Alfred Iverson's 1,400 on Oak Hill itself; Junius Daniel's 2,100 in the fields along McPherson's Ridge facing the railroad cut and Stone's brigade. Stephen Ramseur's brigade of just over 1,000 men was held in reserve.

Opposing Rodes were the recently deployed troops of General John C. Robinson's division. The first brigade to arrive was that of Brigadier General Henry Baxter, whose unit comprised about 1,200 troops. He was positioned along the Mummasburg Road, with the right side of his line refused parallel to the road facing north and the left side angled west to meet the threat of Iverson. The brigade of Brig. General Gabriel Paul, 1,500, would arrive once the fighting had begun.

Rodes began his attack on Baxter around 2:00 p.m. He ordered a concerted attack by O'Neal and Iverson on Baxter's outnumbered troops. But confusion had set in early on the brigade commanders and neither were able to coordinate their attacks properly. O'Neal only sent in three of his five regiments in against Baxter, and he himself stayed back and commanded from the rear (Coddington, 1968). Approaching Baxter's men, O'Neal's troops came under pesky fire from some XI Corps units deployed to his left (to be discussed later). "Throwing his regiments against Baxter's line, posted behind the stone wall which ran just south of and parallel with the Mummasburg Road, O'Neal was repelled with heavy loss" (Hassler, 1970, p. 90).

The quick retreat of O'Neal exposed Iverson's left flank immediately. At 2:30 Rodes quickly ordered Iverson's troops forward, but like O'Neal, Iverson did not lead his men into the fray himself (Coddington, 1968). As Iverson's men approached across the field from Oak Hill to the Union position, Baxter's men, in what seemed to be one fluid motion, rose from their concealment behind a stone wall and began to mow down the approaching Confederate line. Then receiving some aid from Cutler's men to the left and some of Stone's units near the Pike, Baxter's troops hurled Iverson's men back, capturing nearly 1,000 of Iverson's men. His brigade completely obliterated, Iverson was relieved of command and his remaining troops were placed under the command of Ramseur.

See the Battle Map

So far the Confederate attacks were an abysmal failure. The piecemeal approaches by O'Neal and Iverson, the relative isolation of Doles, and the delay of Daniel on the right all contributed to the initial failure of Rodes' assault. But O'Neal was trying again and Ramseur was moving in to replace Iverson. This brought on Gabriel Paul's brigade to replace Baxter's embattled and fatigued troops and to solidify the whole Union line to the west of town. Paul's men arrived in time to assist in repulsing a second attack by O'Neal and to prepare for the larger assault to come in their front to the west from Ramseur.

At about this time the Union XI Corps was facing a strong attack by the other Confederate division arriving from the north, that of Jubal Early. Earlier in the day, Schurz deployed his troops north of town in accordance with Howard's orders to meet the threat of Early's approaching units. On the left near the Mummasburg Road was Alexander Schimmelfennig's brigade, under the command of Col. George von Amsberg. To his right was the brigade of Col. Wladimir Krzyzanowski, and Adelbert Ames continued the line. Finally on the extreme right on an eminence to be known later as Barlow's Knoll, was the brigade of Leopold von Gilsa of General Francis Barlow's division. In all the XI Corps line comprised about 5,500 men. As mentioned previously, the brigade of Brig. General Adolph von Steinwehr remained on Cemetery Hill.

The XI Corps line did not have the same advantage of the cover of natural terrain the rest of the Union line had. It was exposed in open plain, afforded little natural protection and had no stone walls. Early's force, in concomitance with Doles' attack, would exploit this perfectly. The very presence of Doles and O'Neal prevented Schurz from linking with Robinson, thus exposing the formers left flank. Further, two Confederate batteries on Oak Hill would prove to be a pesky nuisance on the left of the XI Corps' line.